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ABSTRACT 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a computer systems design concept which aims to achieve reusability and inte-
gration in a distributed environment through the use of autonomous, loosely coupled, interoperable abstractions known 
as services. In order to interoperate, communication between services is very important due to their autonomous nature. 
This communication provides services with their functional strengths, but also creates the opportunity for the loss of 
privacy. In this paper, a Privacy Protection Framework for Service-Oriented Architecture (PPFSOA) is described. In 
this framework, a Privacy Service (PS) is used in combination with privacy policies to create privacy contracts that out-
line what can and cannot be done with a consumer’s personally identifiable information (PII). The privacy policy con-
sists of one-to-many privacy rules, with each rule created from a set of six privacy elements: collector, what, purpose, 
retention, recipient and trust. The PS acts as an intermediary between the service consumer and service provider, to es-
tablish an unbiased contract before the two parties begin sending PII. It is shown how many Privacy Services work to-
gether to form the privacy protection framework. An examination of what current approaches to protecting privacy in 
an SOA environment is also presented. Finally, the operations the PS must perform in order to fulfill its tasks are out-
lined. 
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1. Introduction 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) presents many cha- 
llenges and security is considered to be one of the most 
difficult [1]. Security is a far reaching area covering such 
topics as authorization, authentication, auditing and pri- 
vacy [2]. Amid all of these different areas of study, pri- 
vacy often gains the least attention [3,4]. This lack of 
attention and the lack of any suitable solution are strong 
motivating factors in creating a privacy protection solu- 
tion. 
Privacy has no single definition as it is subjective to 
each individual. The definition of privacy in this paper is 
the ability to control information about oneself that has 
not been released, and to retain some measure of control 
over the information that has. Though often used inter- 
changeably, privacy differs from both confidentiality and 
secrecy. Confidentiality refers to how private information 
provided to a third party is protected from release. Se- 
crecy differs from privacy by being less about control of 
information, and more about keeping information invisi- 
ble. For example, one’s age may be considered private, 
but it is not a secret that a person has an age. 
SOA provides a solution to finding, utilizing and inte- 
grating many different services to meet the business re- 
quirements of a consumer. The usefulness of services in 
providing business solutions is directly linked to the 
amount of interactions between different services. This 
property of the SOA domain poses a unique and chal- 
lenging problem for dealing with privacy protection. As 
an increasing number of services are composed together, 
often from multiple sources, it becomes easier for a con- 
sumer to unwittingly expose private information. A com- 
mon approach to protecting consumers from this expo- 
sure is to provide pseudonyms to identifying information. 
However this solution is incomplete as even hidden iden- 
tities can be deduced by tracking patterns of usage [3]. 
Similarly, by tracking only seemingly harmless informa- 
tion, such as only the websites an anonymous consumer 
visits, one can deduce to a reasonable certainty, informa- 
tion including the consumer’s age, gender, race and loca- 
tion. With the ability to perform more complicated tasks 
through SOA such as Internet banking [5], the risk of 
exposing unique personally identifiable information (PII) 
becomes a reality. The release of PII, including credit 
card numbers and social insurance numbers, can lead to  
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serious problems such as identify theft and falsified tran- 
sactions. Most SOA services do not explain how or if 
they will collect personal information and those that do 
often do so in complex and confusing language that the 
average consumer cannot understand. The former situa- 
tion gives a consumer no comfort at all, while the latter 
creates a one-way mirror effect [6] where PII is asked for 
but consumers do not know how it will be used. A pri- 
vacy solution should address these issues, alerting a con- 
sumer to how their information can and will be used. 
Another concern for a privacy solution is that it should 
not rely too heavily on customization or input from the 
consumer it is designed to protect, both initially and dur- 
ing its operation. As privacy is subjective and difficult to 
define, many consumers are left unqualified to make de- 
cisions on their own privacy [7]. Consumers want secu- 
rity, but they do not want to see it working [8]. Thus 
once configured, the privacy solution should run as si- 
lently as possible, only alerting the consumer when ab- 
solutely necessary. 
In our past work [9,10], we have outlined the creation 
of privacy elements that represent enough information to 
thoroughly protect a consumer’s privacy. What the con- 
sumer should be able to do and know is determined 
based on accepted principles used to protect privacy 
around the world [11]. The privacy elements together 
form a single privacy rule. A set of privacy rules along 
with identifying information creates a privacy policy. 
Previous attempts at privacy policies have left the defini- 
tion of each element vague [12] or specific to a single 
situation [13]. In this paper these element descriptions 
will be expanded and finalized, defining what each ele- 
ment can be and how each element will be compared. An 
additional goal is to produce a policy whose rules allow 
it to cover both general conditions as well as very spe- 
cific situations. The privacy policy will be defined and 
constructed using XML. The comparison of two privacy 
policies, one from a service consumer and another from a 
service provider, is used to create a privacy contract. This 
comparison will be accomplished by a Privacy Service 
(PS). The PS will also handle negotiations with the ser- 
vice consumer if conflicts between the two privacy poli- 
cies arise. 
There are several goals that together form the scope of 
this paper, which will now be outlined. The primary goal 
is to create a Privacy Protection Framework for Service- 
Oriented Architecture (PPFSOA). The PPFSOA makes 
use of privacy policies that can accurately portray the 
privacy of a service in any situation. To meet this goal, 
the definition of a privacy policy is created which con- 
tains rules made of six privacy elements: collector, what, 
purpose, retention, recipient and trust. A privacy policy 
allows a service consumer and provider to outline how 
they wish to deal with personally identifiable information  
(PII). The privacy framework includes a PS which has 
the primary job of comparing privacy policies to create 
binding privacy contracts. This PS is an autonomous, 
loosely coupled service that can be published and dis- 
covered in a repository. These properties allow the PS to 
be used and reused by many different consumers and 
providers. The PS will be detailed, with its role in the 
service consumer-provider-broker relationship defined. 
As privacy is but one part of security, an additional goal 
of the PS is to work in conjunction with other security 
services within a larger security framework [14]. 
The rest of this paper is divided into sections. Section 
2 presents work related to the field of SOA privacy. Sec- 
tion 3 outlines the privacy elements required to protect 
the privacy of a consumer. How the privacy elements are 
created from accepted privacy practices is shown. These 
privacy elements form the basis of privacy rules. Privacy 
rules compose a privacy policy. Finally, two privacy po- 
licies are compared to create a privacy contract. In Sec- 
tion 4 the PS is introduced, which has the job of compar- 
ing privacy policies to create privacy contracts. How the 
PS acts in the typical SOA service consumer-provider- 
broker relationship is explained. It is also explained in 
Section 4 how many Privacy Services work together to 
form a privacy protection framework. Section 5 exam- 
ines the implementation of the PS by outlining the opera- 
tions the PS must perform in order to fulfill its tasks. 
These operations include both the internal and external 
processes of the PS. Section 6 presents a discussion on 
the work done in this paper, while Section 7 presents a 
summary and outlines possibilities for future work. 
2. Related Work 
In this section, the novelty of our work will be high- 
lighted by its comparison to other privacy protection ap- 
proaches. 
IBM has presented a complete security model of SOA 
applications [15]. The model is presented by focusing on 
a banking industry scenario and consists of three levels 
of security: Business Security Services, Security Policy 
Infrastructure and IT Security Services. IBM combines 
the task of providing authorization and privacy into one 
group of services. Authorization in this case, is determi- 
ning if a consumer has the right to access information. 
Privacy is considered an extension of this definition, de- 
termining if a consumer has the right to access Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII). This differs from the ap- 
proach in this paper as authorization and privacy are 
considered tasks for two separate services. The approach 
by IBM to determining privacy authorization is done 
through the use of privacy policies. IBM relies on the 
standard WS-Privacy to describe how service consumers 
and providers state their privacy preferences within a  
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policy and XACML [16] to define and evaluate a policy. 
This reliance on WS-Privacy is ultimately the weakness 
of the IBM approach, as no such standard currently exists. 
WS-Privacy has been long discussed, with an anticipated 
completion date of 2004 [17], however it has yet to be 
completed. With the absence of WS-Privacy, the frame- 
work given by IBM lacks the vocabulary required to 
provide a proper privacy solution. 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is 
a standard created by the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) [18] that provides websites with a standard for- 
mat for stating their privacy preferences. Privacy policies 
expressed in P3P can be formatted into readable docu- 
ments quickly and easily by software known as user 
agents. P3P is designed as a protocol for websites and 
does not translate into the SOA domain; however the 
basic approach of P3P does provide useful insights into 
protecting privacy. P3P was designed around the Fair 
Information Practices (FIP) developed by the Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development [19]. 
It is from these same FIP that the metamodel presented 
here was developed. P3P is designed in XML and uses 
the OECD principles to create eight top level tags [20]: 
category, data, purpose, recipient, access, retention, dis- 
putes and remedies. These eight categories represent the 
OECD principles in a similar manner to what is de- 
scribed in this paper; however as P3P was not designed 
for an SOA environment, the set of tags offered by P3P 
differs from the values chosen in this paper. Another 
difference between this paper and P3P is that P3P does 
not allow for comparisons between the values for each 
tag. No option is considered more or less secure than 
another and therefore P3P is not directly enforceable 
[21]. 
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) has created an XML- 
based, general purpose access control policy language 
known as eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) [16]. XACML is designed to support the re- 
quirements of most authorization systems by providing 
the syntax for a policy language and the semantics for 
processing the policies [22]. XACML is platform inde- 
pendent and supports directly enforceable policies [23]. 
XACML uses an abstract model for policy enforcement, 
where all requests to access a resource must travel through 
the abstract component known as the Policy Enforcement 
Point (PEP) [23]. The PEP first gathers the access re- 
quests and then requests authorization from the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP). The PDP evaluates the authoriza- 
tion request and makes a decision based on any applica- 
ble policies and attributes related to the request that it can 
find. The PDP makes the authorization decision, but has 
no control over the enforcement of the decision, which is 
the responsibility of the PEP [23]. 
Recently OASIS has developed a Web Service profile 
of XACML known as WS-XACML [24] that can be used 
in the context of Web Services for privacy policies. Any 
WS-XACML Assertion consists of Requirements and 
Capabilities [24]. XACMLPrivacyAssertion, a specific 
definition of WS-XACML for privacy, requires a proper 
policy vocabulary to describe its Requirements and Ca- 
pabilities. P3P is often selected as this vocabulary. 
Although both P3P and XACML can be used to ex- 
press privacy policies, they have different roles. A P3P 
policy is able to express privacy in a high level, easily 
readable form. An XACML policy expresses the same 
privacy conditions as the P3P policy, but in terms that a 
computer access control mechanism can understand and 
enforce [25]. By using P3P inside of XACMLPriva- 
cyAssertion, this high level expression of privacy can be 
converted into a lower level machine readable format. 
Dürbeck, Schillinger and Kolter [26] identify security 
requirements for an eGovernment Semantic SOA (SSOA). 
One of the security requirements they focus on is privacy. 
The authors make no specific selection of a privacy lan- 
guage, but instead identify potential candidates. The lan- 
guages they select are P3P [18], EPAL [27] and XACML 
[16]. Along with using one of these languages, the au- 
thors suggest allowing for different privacy preferences 
per each process. They also suggest that the service pro- 
vider provide mechanisms to enforce the consumer’s pri- 
vacy preferences. 
Yee and Korba [12] have created a privacy policy spe- 
cifically for e-services which could be used in an SOA 
environment. The policy is derived from the Model Code 
for the Protection of Personal Information created by the 
Canadian Standards Association [28]. This Canadian mo- 
del was based on the OECD guidelines and therefore has 
a similar list of principles [29]. From the guidelines of 
the CSA, Yee and Korba [12] extract five privacy ele- 
ments: collector, what, purposes, retention time, and dis- 
close-to. These five elements represent the same infor- 
mation as five of the six elements described in this paper, 
with the exception of trust. Also unlike this paper, the 
elements presented by Yee and Korba are not fully de- 
fined. Beyond some examples of what a document con- 
taining these elements would look like, no definitions for 
the possible values of the elements could be found. From 
the examples the authors present [12], it appears specific 
values for whatever system is using the policy is envi- 
sioned, rather than a more general set of definitions. One 
of the goals of the metamodel in our paper is to create 
policies that can be specific when the situation warrants 
it, or can be general to encompass the privacy of many 
situations. 
Yee [30] has another work that outlines an approach 
for estimating the privacy protection capability of a Web 
service provider. It gives an approach to what types of  
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data and equations are required to estimate privacy in a 
provider. This provides an example of how estimation of 
privacy can be done for a provider service. 
3. Privacy Protection for SOA 
A privacy policy consists of privacy rules, which are in 
turn created from a set of privacy elements. In this se- 
ction the privacy elements and rules that compose the 
privacy policy will each be explained and defined. The 
definition process will start from the most basic concept, 
the privacy element, and show how these privacy ele- 
ments form privacy rules. 
3.1. Privacy Elements from OECD Principles 
A goal of this paper is the construction of a privacy con- 
tract. The most basic part of this privacy contract will be 
the individual privacy elements. These privacy elements 
are designed to build privacy rules that can be general 
enough to function in many environments that use ser- 
vices, while retaining the ability to be specific to one 
case if required. This ability will allow the privacy ele- 
ments to form rules that thoroughly protect privacy in 
either the general or specific case. A justification for the 
selection of the privacy elements must first be outlined. 
The elements to be created will be based on the Fair In- 
formation Practices (FIP) developed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [19]. The 
FIP created by the OECD were selected as the basis for 
the privacy elements in our framework because these 
guidelines have been used as the model for most of the 
privacy legislation throughout the world [11]. The OECD 
FIP consists of eight principles: Collection Limitation, 
Data Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Se- 
curity Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation, 
and Accountability [19]. The information that is required 
to be exchanged between service consumer and provider 
in order to satisfy these principles must be extracted. 
This extraction process is further described in our previ- 
ous works [9,10]. After this process, six privacy elements 
are found to be required, which are described as follows: 
 Collector: The collector of the data. 
 What: What type of data will be collected. 
 Retention: The length of time the collected data can 
be stored. 
 Purpose: The reasons for which the data is collected. 
 Recipient: Which parties, if any, the data is allowed 
to be disclosed. 
 Trust: The level of trust of a PS. 
Not every principle outlined in the OECD guidelines 
has been addressed by the requirements outlined above. 
This is because a privacy metamodel can only fulfill every 
privacy concern when included within a larger security 
framework. The Security Safeguards principle states that  
the data must be protected against unauthorized access 
and release [19]. These concerns are addressed through 
the use of traditional security techniques, such as authen- 
tication, authorization and encryption. 
The Accountability principle states the more abstract 
concern of holding the service provider responsible for 
complying with all the other principles [19]. Accoun- 
tability presents a unique problem for the SOA environ- 
ment as the ability to provide enforcement is difficult and 
often nonexistent. It is therefore decided that account- 
ability will be managed through the use of auditing. With 
the addition of an Auditing Service (AdS), neither party 
would be able to deny how data has been used. These re- 
quirements fall outside the scope of this privacy meta- 
model. Legislation would also likely be required to assist 
with accountability, as the AdS cannot determine viola- 
tions any provider makes within their own systems, for 
example retaining information longer than the agreed 
upon retention time. 
With the six privacy elements identified, a formal de- 
finition for each must be created. This will be accomp- 
lished next through the creation of a definition to specify 
the range of values each element can consist of, and the 
criteria for comparison of each element. Collector, what, 
retention, purpose, recipient and trust are the six privacy 
elements. Together, these six elements form a single pri- 
vacy rule. A privacy policy is created by combining one- 
to-many privacy rules together with an identifying owner 
tag. This privacy policy structure is shown in Figure 1. 
The privacy policy of a consumer contains no actual pri- 
vate information about that consumer, only their prefe- 
rences for protection. As such, the policy itself is unclas- 
sified and can be passed between Privacy Services as 
required. 
3.2. Privacy Elements for SOA 
Definition 1 (Privacy Policy): We define a privacy policy 
as a tuple <PP, CP, f> where pp = <Cp, Wp, RTp, Pp, RCp, 
Tp>, pp PP represents a privacy rule associated with 
elements of collector, what, retention, purpose, recipient 
and trust respectively on the service provider side, cp = 
<Cc, Wc, RTc, Pc, RCc, Tc>, cp CP is the consumer’s 
privacy rule similarly, f is the set of comparison rules used 
to match the corresponding privacy elements between PP 
and CP. 
3.2.1. Collector Element 
The collector element states the name of the organization 
or party who will be collecting the data. 
Definition 2 (Collector): On the provider side, Cp con- 
sists of a single name of the service provider; on the 
consumer side, Cc consists of either a set of possible ser- 
vice provider names or the term “Any”. f(Cc  Cp) = true 
if Cc = “Any” or Cc Cp. 
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Figure 1. Privacy policy structure. 
 
If “Any” is selected by the consumer, no comparison 
will be made between the fields. If a set of one or more 
names is specified by the consumer, this consumer set 
must contain the name specified by the provider in order 
for the comparison to be successful. 
3.2.2. What Element 
The what element allows the privacy policy to outline 
what types of private information will be collected. It is 
impossible to universally declare one piece of informa- 
tion more private than another since what is considered 
private information varies greatly between different in- 
dividuals. Instead, individuals are allowed to rank their 
information according to four ordered levels, based on 
the levels of classification used by the government of the 
United States of America [31]. Though these levels are 
the same as the Bell-La Padula (BLP) model [32], the 
framework presented in this paper does not share the 
same properties as BLP, such as no write-down. This 
scheme of classification was selected because it is in use 
throughout the world and the vocabulary used is such 
that a layperson could easily discern the order in which 
the levels are ranked. 
An individual acting as a service consumer would be 
required to sort a list of the most common types of pri- 
vate information into the four levels according to their own 
preferences. These four levels are Top Secret (“TS”), 
Secret (“S”), Confidential (“C”), and Unclassified (“U”). 
This information would be saved on the consumer side in 
a document called a What Element Ranking (WER). This 
requirement does place some responsibility on the 
individual, which should regularly be minimized. Due to 
the subjective nature of private information, this responsi- 
bility is unavoidable. 
Definition 3 (What): We define PI = <PIp, PIc> to be 
private information required for the provider and 
consumer sides containing all of the different types of PII 
such as name, age, address, sex, and so on. H = {“TS”, 
“S”, “C”, “U”} is a hierarchy set with order 
“TS”>“S”>“C”>“U”. On the provider side, Wp = PIp is a 
set of required private information. On the consumer side, 
WER = {PITS, PIS, PIC, PIU} is PIc ordered with H  
and Wc = h, h H is a one of four possible H values 
correspondingly. f(Wc  Wp) = true if Wp.h ≤ Wc and Wp 
wer, wer  WER, wer.h = Wc. 
The set of values specified by the provider will be 
compared to the level selected by the consumer and their 
corresponding WER. In order for this element to be com- 
pared successfully, each of the values mentioned by the 
provider must be less than or equal to the level selected 
by the consumer. If any piece of information asked for by 
the provider is missing from the consumer’s WER, the 
consumer will be informed and given the opportunity to 
add it. 
3.2.3. Purpose Element 
The purpose element is important in determining if a ser- 
vice consumer and service provider should be allowed to 
interact and share information. Purpose can be inter- 
preted in two different ways. The first is to consider the 
purpose to be the goal of the service, such as for “Iden- 
tification”. The second interpretation is for purpose to 
outline the operational reasons for needing data access, 
and will consist of four possibilities, No Collection and 
No Distribution (“NC&ND”), Collection & No Distri- 
bution (“C&ND”), Collection and Limited Distribution 
(“C&LD”), and Collection and Distribution (“C&D”). In 
order to fulfill both of these interpretations, a purpose 
element that consists of two parts, a goal and an oper- 
ation, will be created. The goal is required from the ser- 
vice provider in order to inform the consumer and to 
satisfy the OECD guidelines. If the consumer wishes to 
limit their data to a particular goal they have that option, 
or they can choose “Any” and allow any purpose as long 
as it satisfies the second criterion. This second criterion 
is the operation, which will consist of four ordered levels 
outlining the possible operational uses of data. 
Definition 4 (Purpose): A Purpose P is a tuple <g, o> 
which contains a goal g, and an operation o. On the 
provider side, g = <Records, Mapping, Identification…> 
if P = Pp, while on the consumer side, g can be either 
“Any” or g = <Records, Mapping, Identification…> if P 
= Pc. For both sides, o is a value from four levels 
{“NC&ND”, “C&ND”, “C&LD”, “C&D”} with the 
order “NC&ND” > “C&ND” > “C&LD” > “C&D”. f(Pc 
 Pp) = true if (Pc.g = “Any” or Pc.g = Pp.g) and Pc.o ≤ 
Pp.o. 
The creation of a hierarchy allows for the comparison 
of two privacy policies even if the specific goal of the 
provider has not been outlined by the consumer. As long 
as the consumer has defined a rule with the value “Any” 
selected in the goal portion of the purpose element, a 
valid comparison can be made if the consumer’s corre- 
sponding operation level is less than or equal to the pro- 
vider’s operation level. This greatly reduces the total 
number of rules required in the privacy policy of a 
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consumer. If the consumer has specified any other value 
in the goal portion of the purpose element, two compa- 
risons must be done in order to successfully compare the 
element. First, the goal portion of the purpose element of 
the consumer must equal the goal portion of the purpose 
element of the provider. Second, the level of operation 
selected by the consumer must be less than or equal to 
the level of operation selected by the provider. 
3.2.4. Retention Element 
Retention is an element that outlines how long a con- 
sumer’s data may be stored by a provider. For the con- 
sumer, the retention element RTc is an integer –1 or 
greater, used to state in days, how long data can be held 
by a provider. The value of –1 is used to represent the 
case where gathered information is allowed to be re- 
tained for an unlimited amount of time. This is useful 
when a consumer is not concerned with how long a par- 
ticular piece of information is held. Zero is a valid input 
for RTc and it represents that any data collected on the 
consumer must be deleted immediately upon completion 
of the service. On the provider side, the retention element 
RTp is used to state how long they wish to retain a con- 
sumer’s data. RT is a non-negative integer which repre- 
sents the number of days past the completion of the 
service the data may be held. Zero is a valid input for RTp, 
and represents that any data collected will be deleted 
immediately upon completion of the service. 
Definition 5 (Retention): Retention, RT, consists of a 
non-negative integer representing days. The consumer 
has the additional choice of selecting –1, which repre- 
sents an unlimited amount of time. f(RTc  RTp) = true if 
RTc = –1 or RTp ≤ RTc. 
3.2.5. Recipient Element 
The recipient element is unique in its comparison by 
working in conjunction with both the purpose and colle- 
ctor elements. The recipient element is only compared if 
the Collection & Limited Distribution (“C&LD”) level is 
specified in the operation portion of the consumer’s 
purpose element. If this level is specified by the consu- 
mer, they must select from one of two options: “Deli- 
very” or “Approved”. If “C&LD” is not selected by the 
consumer, Recipient may be left blank and is ignored. 
“Delivery” is selected by the consumer if they will allow 
for any third party to be involved as long as it is required 
in order to deliver the original service. This option is also 
useful in situations where the consumer does not know 
which parties may be involved in the transaction but still 
wish for the transmission of their data to be limited. 
“Approved” allows for the consumer to specify a list of 
approved providers who are then allowed to have the 
consumer’s data passed to them. If “C&LD” and “App- 
roved” are selected, the names listed in the provider’s 
recipient element must be a subset of the names listed in 
the consumer’s collector element in order for a succe- 
ssful comparison. 
Definition 6 (Recipient): For the provider side, Reci- 
pient RCp will consist of a set of names, listing each third 
party service provider who could possibly receive data 
from the original service provider. For the consumer side, 
RCc will be empty or state “Delivery” or “Approved”. 
f(RCc  RCp) = true if (RCc =  and Pc.o ≠ “C&LD”) or 
(Pc.o = “C&LD” and RCc = “Delivery”) or (Pc.o = 
“C&LD” and RCc = “Approved” and RCp   Cc). 
The recipient element outlines who is permitted to 
have the data passed to them. Since the consumer speci- 
fies who may receive their data with the collector ele- 
ment, the recipient element does not need to list any pro- 
vider names. For the provider, recipient will consist of a 
set of names, listing each third party service provider 
who could possibly receive data from the original service 
provider. 
3.2.6. Trust Element 
The trust element gives the consumer a degree of control 
over what PS can be used to negotiate the privacy con- 
tract. Without this ability, the consumer would have no 
assurance that the policy comparison is being done 
without bias. The provider in this element provides the 
name of the PS it wishes to use. There are four levels of 
trust a consumer can select for a PS to have: High (“H”), 
Moderate (“M”), Low (“L”) and Not Required/Not 
Ranked (“NR”). 
Definition 7 (Trust): On the provider side, the trust 
element Tp is represented as the name of a privacy 
service. R = {“H”, “M”, “L”, “NR”} is a hierarchy set 
with order “H” > “M”> “L” > “NR”. On the consumer 
side, trust element Tc = r, r  R is one of four possible R 
values correspondingly. f(Tc  Tp) = true if Tc ≤ Tp.r. 
For the comparison of this element to be successful, 
the trust level of the PS the provider supplies must be at 
least as high as the level chosen by the consumer. Ra- 
tings are given to each PS by consumer or provider ser- 
vices that have previous experience using the PS. These 
ratings can be used to develop a trust metric. Trust me- 
trics are algorithms that are able to predict the trust- 
worthiness of an unknown user [33], or in the case of 
SOA, an unknown service. Trust metrics fall into two 
large categories, global and local. Global trust metrics 
contain one level of trust for each member in the com- 
munity so every member has the same opinion of every 
other member. Local trust metrics allow for each member 
of the community to have a different opinion on each 
other member. Local trust metrics provide finer control 
over the levels of trust in a system, but due to their com- 
plexity, are far more computationally expensive than 
global trust metrics [33]. Due to the large number of po-  
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ssible services in an SOA, a global trust metric is re- 
commended. The selection of a specific type of global 
trust metric and its use falls outside of the scope of this 
paper as there are many different trust metrics available 
[33], each of which should be considered in greater detail. 
This selected global trust metric will be used to deter- 
mine the level of the service: high, moderate or low. If a 
service does not participate in the global trust metric or 
has yet to be assigned a proper trust level, the fourth 
level of not ranked will be used. 
The question of who will carry out the trust classi- 
fication is an important one. The classification can be 
carried out either internally by the company or party that 
provides the PS, or externally by an outside body. Inter- 
nally would require no extra party be involved and there- 
fore less work, but ultimately will be too unconvincing to 
a consumer. If each PS simply rates itself, the consumer 
would be unconvinced by the credibility of the rating. 
Therefore the latter option is required, that being an ex- 
ternal body which would gather the ratings, generate and 
store the trust metrics. Such a body could be a trusted 
organization such as the W3C, OECD or local govern- 
ment. Ultimately there must be some motivation for 
services to not provide the governing body with false in- 
formation. This must come in the form of legislation that 
provides punishment for breaks of privacy and for know- 
ingly providing false data. A government acting as the 
trusted organization is the best solution as they can enact 
laws and provide enforcement. Such legislation has 
already been enacted by many countries around the 
world [34,35]. If a service resides outside the jurisdiction 
of a government that performs privacy trust rankings and 
therefore cannot be ranked, it will remain at the NR level. 
If a consumer wishes to use one of the NR ranked ser- 
vices they can knowing they are at further risk, otherwise 
a more local and ranked service can be used. 
3.3. Providing Context 
It is important that any privacy policy be able to provide 
specific context if required. This means that a consumer 
should be able to specify one situation where their infor- 
mation is released and another very similar situation 
where their information is not released. This is provided 
in the privacy policy presented here by having rules that 
include elements that allow for specific input, such as 
purpose, goal and collector, and allowing multiple rules 
per policy. With these tools available, a consumer will be 
able to create rules that allow for the release of different 
information in specific situations. 
3.4. Providing Context 
With the elements of the privacy policy now defined, it 
can be shown how this implementation improves on  
current, popular privacy policy implementations, such as 
P3P and XACML. P3P has a number of identified areas 
for improvement, and one of these areas is the lack of 
specificity in outlining the purpose for gathering data 
[36]. This is addressed in this section by the purpose 
element, which is sub-divided into two areas, goal and 
operation, allowing for greater descriptions. Another area 
P3P needs improvement in is transitivity, where privacy 
may not be protected when information is passed from 
one party to another [36]. This is addressed in the privacy 
policy model presented in this section through the 
development of hierarchies for elements that are not dire- 
ctly comparable, ensuring information is only passed to 
parties that are at least as secure as the original provider. 
XACML and P3P perform complementary services, where 
P3P is a high level, human readable vocabulary and 
XACML is a low level vocabulary understood by access 
control mechanisms [25]. As the privacy policy defini- 
tion presented here improves upon P3P in an SOA envi- 
ronment, the presented privacy policy could replace P3P 
and work together with XACML. 
4. Privacy Contract Agreement 
With the elements that compose privacy rules now de- 
fined, along with how each should be compared, it next 
becomes necessary to outline how this comparison should 
be carried out. In this section the stages required to agree 
upon a privacy contract when establishing a connection 
between a service consumer and provider will be de- 
scribed. A Privacy Service (PS) supplied by a trusted 
third party will be used as an intermediary between the 
service provider and consumer. The third party PS is 
required to ensure the comparison of privacy policies is 
done correctly and without bias. The PS also allows for 
the final contract to be stored in a neutral location. The 
comparison of policies is carried out using the rules de-
fined in the previous section. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
five main stages in this process. 
4.1. Publish Stage 
Publish is the first stage, which requires the service pro- 
vider to send information about itself to the service broker 
to be published. This information includes where the ser- 
vice is located, how to establish communication and what 
tasks the service can provide. The service broker acts as a 
repository, so this information can be advertised to be dis- 
covered by a service consumer. This stage is unchanged in 
the given scenario from a typical service publishing stage 
that does not concern itself with privacy. 
4.2. Find Stage 
In the next stage, Find, a service consumer sends a re- 
quest to the service broker asking for a service provider  
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Figure 2. Contract agreement and contact stages. 
 
to help accomplish a task. The service broker will return 
the information it has on a matching service. This stage is 
also unchanged from a typical service discovery scenario. 
4.3. Privacy Inquiry Stage 
Privacy Inquiry is the third stage and the first that is 
unique to the approach in this paper. Once the service 
consumer has retrieved the information on the service 
provider from the service broker, it queries the service 
provider to determine if the provider is willing to create a 
privacy contract. As the Privacy Protection Framework 
for Service-Oriented Architecture (PPFSOA) is an addi- 
tion to the current approach of interaction in an SOA 
environment, there will possibly be services which do not 
implement it. If the consumer receives no reply from this 
early request, they know to look for a different provider. 
If the provider does utilize a privacy policy, they will 
respond with a message confirming this, as well as sug- 
gesting a PS. Due to a trust element being defined by the 
consumer, there is the chance that the PS suggested by 
the provider does not meet the consumer’s desired level 
of protection. Since the PS is itself a service, it can and 
will be published to a service broker, for example the 
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) 
[37]. If the provider’s PS is unacceptable to the consumer, 
they can choose to terminate the transaction or search the 
broker for a suitable PS and submit its details to the pro- 
vider. This optional second half of the Privacy Inquiry 
stage is shown as a dotted line in Figure 2. If the pro- 
vider for some reason rejects the PS, it can provide a 
counter offer or also terminate the transaction. The risk 
of the provider rejecting the PS should be low, as the 
main reason for rejection of the original PS by the con- 
sumer would be its low privacy ranking. Therefore any 
counter proposal should be of a PS that is of greater se- 
curity, which also benefits the provider. However the 
provider does retain the option of rejection, at the risk of 
losing the consumer and any revenue from the con- 
sumer’s patronage. 
4.4. Policy Comparison Stage 
In an example of policy comparison, there is a service 
consumer Ellen Doe and a service provider SaveRx. The 
service provided by SaveRx gives product information on 
drugs available for sale in their stores. SaveRx keeps re- 
cords containing each consumer’s name, address and date 
of birth. It also has the option to provide the consumer 
with directions to their closest SaveRx store through the 
use of a third party mapping service. These requirements 
are specified in the privacy policy of SaveRx as shown in 
Figure 3. 
Ellen has previously created a WER document by ran- 
king the different types of private information according 
to her own preferences. Ellen has also created a privacy 
policy, containing one rule. This rule outlines that Ellen 
is willing to allow anyone to collect her information as 
long as it is ranked Confidential or less. The two docu- 
ments created by Ellen are shown in Figure 3. The dif- 
ferent steps in the Policy Comparison Stage will now be 
explained and shown in context to this example. 
4.4.1. Send Policy 
In the first step, the service consumer sends the PS its 
privacy policy, along with a copy of its WER. Similarly, 
the service provider sends the PS its privacy policy. In 
the presented example, the three documents sent are 
shown in Figure 3. 
4.4.2. Compare Policies 
Using these three documents, the PS compares each ele- 
ment of the consumer rules to a corresponding provider 
rule using the comparisons previously outlined. 
In the example, SaveRx is attempting to collect from 
Ellen her name, address and date of birth. The PS first 
ensures that each of these items can be collected by con- 
sulting the consumer’s WER and policy. Ellen’s policy 
only consists of one rule, which allows for the collection 
of information ranked confidential or lower. The colle- 
cted WER states that all of name, address and date of 
birth are collectable under this rule. 
Continuing the comparison of policies, the PS then 
checks each rule in the provider’s policy against the av- 
ailable rules in the consumer’s policy. The first rule for 
SaveRx attempts to collect a name, address and date of 
birth from Ellen. These three pieces of information are 
all addressed by the first rule in Ellen’s privacy policy 
through comparison of the what element. This rule speci- 
fies that “Any” collector is permitted, so no comparisons 
are required for that element. The next element, retention, 
specifies that Ellen permits this information to be stored 
for a maximum of 30 days. SaveRx will only be storing 
the information for 7 days, so this element also results in 
a pass. The purpose element consists of two parts, a goal 
and an operation. The goal is compared first, and in the  
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given scenario “Records” in SaveRx’s policy is matched 
to the “Any” in Ellen’s policy. The operation of the pur- 
pose elements are then compared and accepted, since 
SaveRx’s “C&ND” is more secure than Ellen’s “C&D”. 
The fifth element, recipient, does not need to be com- 
pared since Ellen has not selected “C&LD” in purpose. 
The last element, trust, is not used directly in this step, as 
they were already used in the Privacy Inquiry stage. If 
the negotiation has proceeded this far, it can be assumed 
that the PS meets the consumer’s requirements. Instead 
of a second comparison, the level of trust given by the 
consumer is simply recorded along with the name of the 
PS. After the first rule is successfully checked, the PS 
would then move to the second rule in SaveRx’s policy. 
These comparisons would be similar to the comparisons 
done previously, with each resulting in a success in this 
case. 
4.4.3. Inform Results 
If any problems with the comparison of the WER or po- 
licies outlined in the previous Compare Policies step oc- 
cur, the service consumer is informed and given the 
chance to change their policy or WER accordingly. If the 
change is made, the Compare Policies step is repeated 
using the changed documents. If the service consumer 
does not choose to change their privacy policy or WER, 
the transaction fails and the consumer returns to the Find 
stage to locate a new service provider. If the policies are 
matched successfully, the two parties are informed and 
asked to sign a finalized privacy contract that outlines 
their agreement. 
In the given example, during the Inform Results step, 
the PS sends the consumer and provider a message in- 
forming both of the positive results gathered in the Com- 
pare Policies step. A request is made in this message for 
each party to sign a copy of the agreed upon privacy 
contract. 
4.4.4. Sign Contract 
In the final step, a copy of the signed privacy contract is 
kept by the PS for record keeping. By signing the contract, 
both parties signify that they understand and acknowledge 
the terms and are now bound to them. This signed copy is 
stored for future reference by the provider of the PS in a 
secure location. An acknowledgement message is sent by 
the PS to both the consumer and provider once both sig-
natures have been received. 
In this example, since the comparison was successful, 
both parties sign the final contract. The acknowledge- 
ment message is sent by the PS to both consumer and 
provider. 
4.5. Bind Stage 
The fifth and final stage is Bind, which occurs once the 
privacy contract has been agreed upon and signed by 
both service provider and consumer. Once this process 
has completed, the two parties are free to interact with 
each other. This stage is the same as the third stage in a 
typical service discovery scenario where privacy is not a 
concern. 
4.6. Privacy Protection Framework for 
Service-Oriented Architecture 
Now that it has been explained how the PS will work 
with policies to create privacy contracts, an overall view 
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of the privacy framework can be provided. This Privacy 
Protection Framework for Service-Oriented Architecture 
(PPFSOA) is shown in Figure 4. 
The PPFSOA is an expansion of the Privacy Contract 
Agreement described earlier in this section. The Privacy 
Contract Agreement outlines how a single PS works with 
a single consumer-provider-broker relationship to provide 
privacy. The PPFSOA utilizes an Enterprise Service Bus 
(ESB) to implement this on a larger scale, providing pri- 
vacy to many consumers at once. The ESB will allow for 
message routing between each PS, monitoring of traffic, 
language transformation, exception management and the 
duplication of a PS when traffic becomes heavy. With the 
use of an ESB, a number of Privacy Services running in 
parallel will be made available to meet the demands of the 
environment. Each individual PS will rely on the message 
routing abilities of the ESB to ensure that it receives 
messages from the correct consumer and provider, and 
that the messages sent by the PS reach their correct des- 
tination. 
The PPFSOA can be adopted into current SOA envi- 
ronments since it requires minimal changes to the parties 
currently involved. The service broker, such as UDDI, 
requires no changes as the privacy service is advertised 
to it as a regular service. The service consumer and pro- 
vider only require the addition of a privacy policy. An 
education campaign would be required to advertise the 
PPFSOA to providers and consumers who do not cur- 
rently implement privacy protection. Software will be 
provided to assist in the creation of privacy policies. This 
software will use a graphical user interface (GUI) to al-  
low the consumer or provider to set their privacy prefe- 
rences to any available level, and will automatically cre- 
ate the policy in the correct XML format once each pre- 
ference is selected. As previously mentioned, the PPF- 
SOA is designed to sort between providers that do and do 
not implement privacy policies, so once a consumer has a 
privacy policy created, the framework will ensure that 
they only deal with providers that have their privacy pre- 
ferences in mind. 
5. Implementation 
The PS now has its place in the service consumer-pro- 
vider-broker relationship defined, along with what tasks 
it can perform. It also has its place defined in the context 
of a larger security framework. How the PS specifically 
carries out its role will be discussed next. The purpose of 
the PS is to act as an intermediary between the service 
consumer and provider and negotiate a privacy contract 
that both sides can agree upon. In the following section 
the operations that the PS will perform in this compari- 
son process are detailed. Since this section deals specifi- 
cally with the PS, in each of the operations listed below it 
is assumed that the service consumer and service pro- 
vider have already completed up to and including the 
Privacy Inquiry stage in the Privacy Contract Agreement 
process, as outlined in the previous section. Sequence 
diagrams are also presented in this section to outline the 
series of events that take place through different policy 
comparison scenarios. 
Figure 5 shows the sequence of events during the sim-  
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plest example of a successful comparison of policies. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the sequence of events during 
another successful comparison of policies, however this 
time after encountering a conflict within the policies. Fi- 
gure 7 demonstrates a conflict that could not be resolved, 
resulting in an unsuccessful comparison of policies. Fig- 
ure 8 outlines the steps in a scenario where policies must 
be converted after a successful initial comparison in order 
to deal with a third party provider. Finally, Figure 9 
shows the steps taken when one party challenges the terms 
of a previously successful comparison of policies. 
5.1. Negotiate Policies Operation 
In this operation, the PS is the recipient of two messages, 
one from the service provider and one from the service 
consumer. The message sent by the service provider con- 
tains a copy of its privacy policy, while the message sent 
by the service consumer contains its privacy policy and a 
copy of its WER. Examples of these three documents can 
be seen in Figure 3. Using these three documents, the 
compare Policies operation is carried out by the PS, 
where each element of the consumer’s rules is compared 
to a corresponding provider rule using the evaluations 
outlined earlier in this paper. If any problems in the 
match occur, a resolve Conflict message is sent to the 
service consumer. This message informs the consumer of 
the problem and suggests changes required to its privacy 
policy or WER. If the consumer replies with a new pri- 
vacy policy and WER, the comparePolicies operation is 
repeated using these new documents and the previous 
service provider privacy policy. 
5.2. Create Contract Operation 
The Create Contract Operation is performed by the PS  
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Figure 6. Successful comparison of policies following a con-
flict. 
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Figure 7. Unsuccessful comparison of policies. 
 
once the Negotiate Policies Operation has completed. In 
this operation a privacy contract is first generated by tak- 
ing the value provided by the consumer, or the provider 
if the provider’s option is more secure. A message is sent 
to both the service consumer and provider stating that an 
agreement has been met and that a final signature is re- 
quired. This requestSignature message also contains a 
copy of the agreed upon privacy terms for both parties to 
observe if they so require. The two parties sign the con- 
tract through the use of a secure identifiable process, 
such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or XML Signa- 
ture [38]. An acknowledgement message is sent to both 
parties informing them that the contract has been signed 
and is final. The privacy terms are combined with the 
names of the provider and consumer, a timestamp, and a 
signature from both parties. Together, these form one en- 
tire privacy contract. The signature acknowledgement 
signifies that the provider and consumer are now free to  
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Figure 9. Challenge of contract following interactions. 
interact. A copy of the contract is then stored by the PS 
in a secure database, along with both policies and the 
consumer’s WER. These documents are stored alongside 
the contract in order to be available in case a challenge is 
made to the validity of the agreement. Examples of the 
Create Contract Operation are shown in Figure 5, Figure 
6, Figure 8 and Figure 9. Each of these diagrams shows 
the same Create Contract Operation occurring in the 
middle of different scenarios. 
5.3. End Contract Operation 
The End Contract Operation begins when a message is 
received from the service consumer that states they refuse 
to change their privacy policy. This refusePolicy message 
is sent in response to an attempt by the PS to negotiate a 
new privacy policy. Once this message is received, the PS 
terminates the attempted negotiations and discards the 
current privacy policies and WER documents it has ga- 
thered. An example of this operation is shown in Figure 7. 
5.4. Convert Policies Operation 
If a service provider requires the use of a third party ser- 
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vice to accomplish a goal, it must become a consumer in 
a new consumer-provider relationship. This operation 
follows the successful contract creation between the ser- 
vice provider and an original service consumer. At some 
point during the interactions between this service con- 
sumer and provider, the provider requires the use of a 
third party service. The original service provider will be- 
gin a Privacy Contract Agreement with the third party 
provider, while alerting the PS that a conversion of con- 
tracts is required. The PS will then generate a new policy 
for the provider-turned-consumer based on the original 
agreement. When the PS receives the policy from the 
third party provider, the generated policy is treated as a 
consumer policy and compared to the third party pro- 
vider policy as if it were a typical consumer-provider 
scenario. An example of the Convert Policies Operation 
is shown in Figure 8. 
5.5. Handle Challenge Operation 
This operation will return the contract and associated 
policies when a challenge message is received from ei- 
ther party. A challenge occurs only after a contract has 
been agreed upon and some interactions between the ser- 
vice consumer and provider have taken place. A request 
Challenge message can then be sent by either party to the 
PS if that party believes information is being used or 
gathered in violation of the signed privacy contract. The 
PS will reply with a return Documents message which 
contains the original contract. An example of the Handle 
Challenge Operation is shown in Figure 9. 
6. Discussion 
Service-Oriented Architecture is a desirable software 
system structure due to the strengths and abilities of its 
interoperable services. Services in an SOA environment 
are loosely coupled to their underlying technologies, re- 
quiring no one standard be followed. These services are 
autonomous and are made available over computer net- 
works by their providers in order to be used, reused or 
combined in any way their consumer prefers. Services 
coordinate by passing information from one service to 
the next, allowing services from many different sources 
to combine to meet any problem or need. This commu- 
nication among services, while provides the backbone of 
an SOA, raises many important privacy concerns. With 
many services possibly passing information between 
themselves, a consumer can quickly become unaware of 
how each service is using their personally identifiable in- 
formation. Businesses have found that in order for any 
emerging technology to gain widespread success, it must 
be trusted by the general population of consumers. Ap- 
plying privacy policies designed for Web pages to an 
SOA environment is not enough to provide adequate 
privacy while maintaining the usability of services. A 
new approach that considers the interactive characteris- 
tics of services must be created to enhance consumer 
privacy while minimizing consumer interruptions. 
The major contribution of this paper to the field of 
SOA privacy is the creation of a Privacy Protection Fra- 
mework for SOA (PPFSOA). The PPFSOA embraces the 
use of a privacy policy suitable for any SOA environ- 
ment. This privacy policy is able to describe privacy rules 
that range from very specific to very general. A compa- 
rison of privacy policies within the PPFSOA is carried 
out in order to create a privacy contract. These compari- 
sons are designed to be impartial, transitive and require 
minimal effort from the consumer. The Privacy Service 
in the PPFSOA is created like any other service in an 
SOA environment. This means the PS is an autonomous, 
loosely coupled service that can be published and dis- 
covered in a repository and reused by many different 
consumers and providers. The PPFSOA includes the 
steps required for the PS to interact with the service pro- 
vider and service consumer, acting as an intermediary 
between the two. 
Other contributions were also made through the crea- 
tion of a privacy policy suitable for protecting privacy in 
an SOA environment. The elements that make up this 
privacy policy were fully defined, outlining the bounda- 
ries of what the elements could and could not be. 
Work in the field of SOA privacy is still young and 
progressing. Within real world SOA environments, pri- 
vacy protection is often ignored. Those few attempts at 
addressing issues of privacy in an industrial SOA setting 
are often done so unsatisfactory or left incomplete. This 
is exemplified in the security approach proposed by IBM, 
in which a privacy standard is referenced that as of yet 
does not exist [15]. Activity in the academic world has 
begun to address the issues related to SOA privacy, but 
has also progressed slowly. The PPFSOA described in 
this paper moves the field forward by taking a serious 
look at the unique privacy concerns of SOA and not set- 
tling for a solution that was originally designed for dif- 
ferent environment. The PPFSOA attempts to take the 
onus of protecting private information off the individual 
consumer. In the cases where the consumer is required to 
perform actions, guidelines and information are provided 
to assist the consumer in making informed decisions. 
The PPFSOA described in this paper provides the abi- 
lity to create privacy contracts. Unfortunately, enforce- 
ment of these privacy contracts is not guaranteed with 
this framework. Providers that choose to disregard the 
contracts they have signed with consumers risk the loss 
of use and profits that will occur when such transgres- 
sions are exposed. In order to provide greater account- 
ability, governing bodies will eventually be required to 
monitor providers to ensure their agreements are fol- 
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lowed. Legislation addressing privacy in an SOA envi- 
ronment would assist any governing body by providing 
tools of enforcement, such as punishment for infractions 
and the ability to audit systems. 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
The PPFSOA allows for privacy elements to be quan- 
tified in order for privacy rule comparisons to be possible. 
This framework has the inherent issue of requiring the 
service provider, consumer and broker to all follow the 
same standard approach. This issue is addressed by the 
fact that no privacy standard for SOA currently exists. 
The PPFSOA was created to fill this need and the end 
goal of the PPFSOA is to become a privacy standard for 
SOA. 
The relatively young age of privacy protection for 
Web services means there are still points to be addressed 
in future work. The PPFSOA that has been suggested 
here needs to be tested in a full business environment. 
This evaluation would provide further evidence of the 
framework’s performance and ability to protect privacy, 
while giving valuable insights to areas that can be im- 
proved or optimized. 
The creation of a unique Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), 
which also acts as a service, is planned. The ESB service 
will work as an interface between the many service con- 
sumers and the PPFSOA. When the PPFSOA is placed 
within a larger security framework, the ESB will also act 
as an interface between the Privacy Service and other 
security services. The ESB will be tasked with the job of 
routing messages from services to their correct destina- 
tion. When in public use, the demand for privacy will 
quickly overwhelm any single PS. To overcome this is- 
sue of traffic, the ESB will also monitor the number of 
requests through the use of an intelligent engine and rep- 
licate the PS as many times as required to meet the cur- 
rent demand. The ability to dynamically replicate the PS 
will provide assurance that each SOAP message sent is 
processed within an appropriate amount of time. Replica- 
tion will also improve the accessibility and performance 
of the PPFSOA, as its intelligent engine will predict the 
number of Privacy Services that are required to process 
the current number of SOAP messages. This will ensure 
a PS is always available for any consumer who wishes 
access to one. 
Different consumers will undoubtedly describe the same 
type of PII in different ways. For example, consumers 
who wish to protect their last name may use the term 
“last name”, “family name” or “surname”. All three 
terms are commonly used and all refer to the same piece 
of PII. Due to this situation, the PS must recognize these 
terms are equal. Similarly, different goals in the purpose 
element may be expressed in different ways. For example, 
“mapping” and “directions” may refer to the same act of 
generating a path from one location to another. In either 
case, the PS will require a Vocabulary Processing Engine 
which will contain a repository of terms and use ontology 
matching to determine which terms correspond to one 
another. This will be particularly important when proc-
essing a consumer’s WER and comparing it to the types 
of information the provider states they wish to col- lect. 
An intelligent core should be added to the PS. An in- 
telligent core would allow the service to make better de- 
cisions when collecting attributes, converting policies 
and resolving conflicts. The intelligent core would also 
provide the PS with the ability to assist the provider in 
making decisions about its privacy policy. In a regular 
case, only the consumer is negotiated with when a con- 
flict in privacy policies occurs. This is done to avoid 
overwhelming a provider with the possibility of multiple 
conflicts with many consumers occurring simultaneously. 
The use of an intelligent core could make decisions as to 
when it is appropriate to reverse this procedure and alert 
the provider. Take for example a situation where a single 
element in the provider’s policy is causing more than 
50% of its consumers to reject the transaction, thereby 
causing the provider to lose a great deal of revenue. The 
PS could alert the provider to this situation and allow the 
provider to determine if they wish to rework their policy 
to meet this demand. 
The privacy requirements presented here also specify 
that upon termination of a privacy contract, a provider 
should produce a list of all third parties with whom it has 
shared the consumer’s information. This list is required to 
inform the consumer which parties now have access to its 
data in order to fulfill the principle of Openness. Future 
work will investigate what role the PS will play in the 
creation and distribution of this list. 
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